BASELINE SURVEY ON GENDER & COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN MOMBASA COUNTY (2019)
The study was commissioned by Collaboration of Women In Development. It interrogates gender issues underlying the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in Mombasa County

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DISCLAIMER

These are the views from the study representatives and the data collected from the selected community by the consultant and are not necessarily the views of Collaboration for Women In Development (CWID).
## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Amani Counseling Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CICC</td>
<td>Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>CVE</td>
<td>Countering Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>CWID</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Director of Criminal Investigations</td>
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<td>EWER</td>
<td>Early Warning and Early Response</td>
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<td>KIIs</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
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<td>MCAP</td>
<td>Mombasa County Action Plan</td>
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<td>MUHURI</td>
<td>Muslim for Human Rights</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counter Terrorism Centre</td>
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<td>NGAF</td>
<td>National Government Affirmative Action Fund</td>
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<td>NPS</td>
<td>National Police Service</td>
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<td>PIL</td>
<td>Public Interest Litigation</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Private Sector Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPSS</td>
<td>Statistical Packages for Social Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>VE</td>
<td>Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>VEO</td>
<td>Violent Extremism Offender</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEF</td>
<td>Women Enterprise Fund</td>
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<td>YEF</td>
<td>Youth Enterprise Fund</td>
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</table>
Impact of Countering Violent Extremism on Women & Their Roles In Prevention. Women’s vital role in efforts to prevent and resolve conflict desires wide-ranging recognition.

They should as well be supported and empowered to challenge violence and radicalization - by all actors – that threatens their communities. However, there is a risk that their efforts could be undermined by the countering violent extremism (CVE) programs by both state and non-state entities.

The 2030 Agenda – the world’s framework for sustainable development – and the Women Peace & Security agenda both include strong commitments to conflict prevention, gender equality and women’s empowerment.
Women in Kenya are often perceived as victims and recipients of security. In so doing, we work against the ability of women providing viable ways to counter violent extremism, promoting gender equity and improving governance in communities that vulnerable to violent extremism recruitment.

This could as well help change the perception of women who tend to support the groups that engage in violence extremism, and rope them into the processes of countering the violence – as mediators, key actors in designing and implementing early warning systems, educators and as members of security forces.

The Kenyan authorities, national and county, seems unenthusiastic to creating conducive structures for early warning and proper reporting system of violent extremism and/or radicalization.

Fear of possible retaliation deters communities especially women from reporting cases of possible radicalization and/or recruitment to the authorities. In addition, without proper structures, women and community in general are left vulnerable as channels for reporting VE cases remain vague and uncoordinated.

A woman is a key influence to her family and often her community – therefore a key part in countering violent extremism. Local context, drivers/factors of recruitment and radicalization to violent extremism, and the situation of women can vary hugely from one county/area/community to another.

So, rather than adopting a ‘one size fits all’ approach, the CVE programs design should be based on rigorous contextual analysis, including gender dynamics, building capacity of women and girls to contribute safely and productively to P/CVE efforts to ensure their security and the security of the community.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction
This study, contracted by CWID, is a baseline survey on CVE that aims to establish, among other things, the current actors, programs/initiatives, challenges and opportunities that exist with regard to countering and prevention of Violent extremism in Mombasa County. The study was conducted in four sub-counties namely: Changamwe, Likoni, Kisauni and Nyali. The study is part of an on-going project dubbed, Inua Mama Initiative Project (funded by Forum SYD under Wajibu Wetu Phase 2). The project will contribute to respect for and fulfilment of human rights, deepening democracy and realization of gender equality in Kenya and to improve attitudes and behaviours of right holders and duty bearers for upholding and defending human rights, democratic culture and gender equality in Kenya.

Key Findings

1. Effects of Violent Extremism - Most women are affected emotionally and economically as compared to their male counterparts who are mainly affected physically
2. Reporting of Violent Extremism cases – Most cases are reported directly to the police stations and chiefs. However, the Aminiyat Concept remains a big hindrance to effective reporting and coordination among key stakeholders.
3. Psychological Support for VE victims – Most victims of VE do not receive psychosocial support. While government has institutions offering general counseling for gender violence, mental and drug abuse victims, most of these institutions do not offer trauma counseling to VE victims and widely depend on volunteer/charity institutions for support.
4. Relationship between and among key actors – Generally, stakeholders have a good working relationship on CVE programs. However, there are instances of conflict between state and non-state actors; county and national government; and some resistance by PSO.
5. County CVE Engagement Forum - The Forum is under-funded and therefore meets on need-basis with support from Office of the Governor (Directorate of CVE). However, there is the need to actively engage more actors under the Sub-County CVE Engagement Forum as the former has limited membership. The latter, which has zero funding currently, will see many community organizations and leaders take active role in CVE initiatives.
6. Awareness Creation & Community outreaches - Awareness programs are mainly run in an ad hoc manner at location or ward level through Chief’s Offices and NGOs. There is limited information on reporting mechanism as well as early signs.
7. Early Warning Systems for CVE – The County Government lacks early warning system on CVE. While the County Government has plans to initiate its development, there is no funding towards supporting the same. Most community members and stakeholders on CVE use their limited knowledge of what forms early signs and response.
PART 1: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1.1 Context
In recent years, the world has witnessed new waves of violent extremism that have taken the lives of many innocent people. Since the beginning of the 21st Century, there has been more than a nine-fold increase in the number of deaths from violent extremism and terrorism. These led to the global declaration of war against terrorism led by the West. Consequently, the war has seen many states take steps to ensure peace and security within state borders and across the globe.

Programs on P/CVE in Kenya and Mombasa County: Kenya, for instance, has taken several steps in ensuring reduction of extremist ideologies. Specifically, initiatives that ensure effective inclusion of all relevant stakeholders in countering violent extremism and in conflict situations have been at the Centre. On 8th March 2016, Kenya joined the list of over 48 countries of the world who have heeded to the United Nations Security Council call to domesticate the National Action Plan (NAP) on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 which was adopted in 2000. The Plan addresses the situation of women in conflict and calls for their participation at all levels of decision-making on conflict resolution and peace building. It recognizes the importance of women’s contribution to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peace building. In September 2016, the President launched the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism, which articulates Kenya’s efforts to prevent terrorism and violent extremism. The national initiatives were followed with similar activities by coastal County governments. Mombasa launched its Counter Violent Extremism Plan on March 2017. The Plan, among other things, contains women’s pillar which lays emphasis on inclusion of women as well as development of gender responsive early warning signs.

Gender Gaps: As various actors design their approaches on CVE, the victims (most of whom are women and girls) are always left out and remain vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment into VE¹. This is attributed to the fact that majority of the terror suspects are always men who are the bread winners. When these suspects are arrested, maimed, killed, or forcefully disappeared, the widows and dependants become vulnerable due to state victimization, community stigma, discrimination, and inability to pay bills and acquire basic needs for the family. These vulnerabilities make them targets for recruitment into terror cells. While reports² show that extremist groups rely upon women to gain strategic advantage, recruiting them as facilitators, raising funds and spreading violent extremist ideologies and martyrs while also benefiting from their subjugation, Kenyan policymakers continue to overlook the ways in which women perpetrate and prevent extremism, putting the Country at a disadvantage in its efforts to prevent terrorism.

Therefore, incorporating women’s distinctive perspectives can lead to better intelligence gathering and more targeted responses to potential security threats. In addition, women-led civil society groups are particularly critical partners in mitigating violence, though counterterrorism efforts too often fail to enlist them. A sustained and systematic gender perspective on terrorism and anti-radicalization is important and overdue. There is evidence³ that demonstrates that gender-sensitive security policies and institutions improve their operational effectiveness; gender-sensitive policies are legitimated policies and built local ownership. In addition to that, they also strengthen civilian oversight and accountability.

**Early Warning Signs and Response Systems:** While much of the CVE programs have taken a curative approach (with spots of securitized preventive measures such as intelligence gathering and arrests) with the main focus on addressing consequences of radicalization and extremism once extremist violence is erupted preventive approach, which could be cost effective and function as a “threat minimizer,” has received less attention by government agencies.

By understanding the process of radicalization and recruitment of women and youth into violent extremism as an evolutionary process, preventive mechanisms could be developed and implemented such as community-based early warning and early response (EWER) systems by engaging local people who bear the brunt of radicalization and extremism in the first place⁴.

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⁴DB Subedi (2017) Early Warning and Response for Preventing Radicalization and Violent Extremism, Peace Review, 29:2, 135-143
PART 2: METHODOLOGY

2.1 Study Objectives

Method Specifically, the baseline survey is expected to:

1. Establish availability and effectiveness of psychosocial support for VE victims: The study hoped to identify organizations/institutions providing support programs for victims of VE, gaps, opportunity for synergy, and sustainabilty of these initiatives.

2. Map out clearly key actors (including Private, Public and CSOs), their roles in the Mombasa CVE initiatives, ongoing programs on CVE and coordination among and between key actors.

3. Establish the availability and/or effectiveness and responsiveness of early warning signs systems for CVE initiatives in Mombasa

2.2 Research Design

A mixed method approach involving a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods was adopted. Mixed method approach was utilized because the two provide optimal measures of validity⁵. Qualitative study refers to one that uses qualitative methods in the gathering and analysis of data that is visual and verbal rather than numerical data manipulation⁶. Qualitative methods involved face-to face in-depth interviews of Key informants including Government Officers, Private Sector, CWIDs linkages, networks and partnerships, and CSOs in the Women’s Pillar of the Mombasa CVE Action Plan. The study reached out to 8 out of the 20 duty bearers. Eight represents 40 percent of the duty bearers and therefore is a representative sample. Focus group discussions⁷ with 2 different groups namely women only group and men only group in the selected study areas were also interviewed. Each of the groups comprised between 6-12 discussants. Quantitative methods involved survey of women and men, vulnerable women who had either been affected by VE, were returnees or knew those that had been affected by VE.

The design was preceded by a pilot study which involved a pre-test of the survey questionnaire and in-depth interviews of a few selected key informants. The rationale for the pre-test was to assess whether the questionnaire was understood by the respondents. Overall, it helped assess the relevance of the questions and also the reliability and validity of the same.

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⁷A form of group interview in which there are several participants and there is emphasis in the questioning on a particular fairly tightly defined topic and the emphasis is upon interaction within a group and the joint construction of meaning (Bryman 2004)
2.3 Study Sites Selection
The baseline was conducted in Mombasa County and specifically Nyali, Lokoni, Kisauni and Changamwe Sub-counties. The rationale for picking the aforementioned was based on the county class variations and it was believed that the information received would be cross-cutting.

2.4 Study Population and Sampling
The study population consisted of families affected by VE, knew about those affected by VE or were returnees. The unit of analysis was individual family members from the families affected by VE. The study adopted both probability and non-probability sampling techniques for the survey of the affected by VE and returnees. CWID provided a sampling frame from which 240 respondents were selected through simple random sampling. Approximately sixty respondents were selected from each of the study areas. The proportion of women to men interviewed was 3:2. The rationale for the stated sample sizes is to enable the consultant carry out the baseline effectively and analyze data within the stipulated period of 20 days. Furthermore, a sample size of 240 was representative and would provide information upon which future data would be comparable. Key informants were purposively selected based on the consultant's knowledge on the personalities with specialized knowledge in the area of study.

2.5 Data Sources
The study used both primary and secondary data sources. Primary data was gathered through quantitative and qualitative methods. The former was gathered through survey and the latter through in-depth interviews of key informants with information on CVE and focus group discussions. Secondary data was obtained from published books such as journals and the Internet and unpublished literature such as policy statements, regulations and official reports/records relating to CVE.

2.6 Data Collection Methods
The study used different methods of data collection including structured interviews, semi-structured interviews, observation and review of documents and other secondary data. Primary data was collected from families affected by VE by use of structured digital questionnaire on a face-to-face basis. Face-to-face was preferred to online or self-administered questionnaire because it reduces cases of non-response. Semi-structured were held with key informants with information on CVE and focus group discussants.
To a large extent, the use of primary research and interviews was conducted with vulnerable subjects such as people affected with VE and returnees. This required building of trust with various groups as well as negotiation of agreements around anonymity and confidentiality, on the one hand, and careful consideration of the safety and security of the researchers, on the other.

*A unit of analysis as an object about which the researcher wants to produce knowledge*
2.7 Data analysis
Data analysis was done in two stages. The first stage involved quantitative analysis to provide general descriptions across individual respondents while the second stage involved qualitative analysis specifically in-depth interviews. Quantitative data analysis was preceded by checking for completeness, consistency and accuracy. This was possible owing to the pre-coding of questionnaires hence making it easy to counter check the filled-out questionnaires. Quantitative data was analyzed by use of Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS).
Qualitative analysis was used for data obtained through key informant interviews and focus group discussions with the eight pre-determined categories. For this analysis the researcher began by familiarizing with the data and also making sense of the responses provided by each of the respondents. The open-ended questions were coded based on the themes derived from the Outcome Journal and the study objectives. Data was sorted using MS Word tables and analyzed.

2.8 Gender considerations
Gender sensitivity- by which the consultant and the team were alert and responsive to the circumstances, experiences and perspectives of in particular women as subjects (as opposed to objects of the study) - and formed the main study consideration. The consultant trained the research team on gender awareness and demonstrated it throughout the study period. The subjects of the study were women and men whose perspectives, experiences and actions on CVE carried comparatively more weight as available research showed that they bore the brunt of violence extremism and therefore had to be purposively positioned to participate fully in preventing and mitigating its effects. That notwithstanding, differential impacts of CVE on women and men also formed a major consideration to ensure comprehensive and gender responsive measures to deal with it.
Social gender power issues between women and men, girls and boys such as access to spaces of advocacy and participation in violence extremism prevention were flagged out as they applied in the locales of the study discussed and appropriate measures taken to ensure equitable participation within the scope of the study and in advocacy spaces.

2.9 Ethical considerations
Considering that the study was on a sensitive topic, all efforts were made to secure the safety of the consultant and the entire research team. The study was conducted within the expected research code that emphasizes gender/diversity responsiveness and ensures that:
● Respondents are well informed fully about the research and allowed to choose to participate voluntarily and maintain the freedom to opt out
● There should be full disclosure of research risks and research team protected from harm, unnecessary risks or mental and physical discomfort that may be inherent in the research procedure
● Interaction with respondents be with their express permission and should not interfere with their privacy or intrude with their lives inappropriately
● Protection of respondents by respecting anonymity when requested and using information collected only for stated intended purposes
● Being faithful to the testimonies/narratives of the respondents and not taking advantage of information collected to use it for unstated purposes
● Being faithful to research findings within appropriate contexts and reporting results accurately
● Questions are asked in a culturally accepted manner and should not be insulting, embarrassing or defy the respondents’ sense of privacy
● Permission should be sought to use Audio visual recording devices and sincere explanation given to how the recordings will be used/kept
● The safety and welfare of the respondents whether brought up as an issue or not should be of outmost importance to the researcher- steps have to be taken to protect and ensure the dignity and welfare of participants as well as those who may be affected by the results of the study.
● Seeking permission/consent from respondents and other stakeholders in case their identity or contributions are to be published which may portent a risk
● Seeking necessary approvals from governance authorities of partners before proceeding
● Not offering financial or other inducements inappropriately to entice respondents to give information
● The right of all stakeholders to have access to the research report and other publications that may arise from the study

2.10 Study Limitations
● The key limitation of the study was related to security of both the field data collectors and respondents, which affected the proposed sampling distribution among the quantitative and qualitative data. Due to the sensitivity of the study, the study relied on the snowballing technique.
● Data from this study is a representation of areas with similar frequency of VE incidents/activity; and thus, should not be over generalized if the area(s) of reference is/are not similar to the areas and sub-counties mentioned in this study.
● The study did not focus on child victims/survivors of VE due to the sensitivity of the subject. This means that the data do not reflect the needs of children.
PART 3: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

This section presents the baseline survey findings from the four sub-counties, focusing on the main objectives, and evaluation criteria.

3.1 RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS

This section presents the demographic characteristics of the 267 respondents from the four sub-counties during the study.

3.1.1 Distribution by Gender

Participation in the Baseline Survey on gender and countering violent extremism was voluntary. Data was collected from 240 respondents, 52% of the respondents were female while male were 48%.

![Gender of the respondents](Image)

3.1.2 Distribution by Age

Of the population that participated in the survey, this is the distribution of the age brackets of the people that participated. The distribution of age for the respondents that participated in the survey is; 18-34 years (53%) of the respondents, 35-60 years (37%) of the respondents and 60 years and above had 10% share.

![Age distribution](Image)
3.1.3 Distribution by Marital Status
From the survey it emerged that, 42% were married, 6% are divorced, 6% separated, 30% single, 7% widowed, 9% could not classify themselves to any of the above.

3.1.4 Distribution by Income
Majority of the respondents (38%) derive their income from small scale businesses, 5% are employed, 17% depend on remittances from relatives and friends, 6% depend on support from their spouses while 35% are involved in other income generating activities e.g. sex work and casual laborer, this is a pointer that majority of the respondents do not have a stable source of income and majorly rely on remittances.

3.2 CONTEXT ANALYSIS
This section details the analysis of various variables that are directly or indirectly co-related to CVE. Specifically, the section will show reports on both perceptions and realities of programs, challenges and opportunities.

3.2.1 Effects of Violent Extremism
Some people experience violent extremism but are not aware if they are victims of the same. From the random sample selected 66% of the population is affected by violent extremism as 34% of the population is not. The respondents who indicated that they are not affected revealed upon further probing that their family members or relatives are victims.
People have different views on how they feel and how they were affected by violent extremism. From the response of the sampled population some people are emotionally affected, others economically, others physically while others had other ways in which they were affected. 69% are emotionally affected, 14% are physically affected, 6% economically while 11% of the respondents reported to have been affected in more than one way (including emotionally, economically, and or physically). While more men were affected physically their female counterparts were mostly affected emotionally.

3.2.2 Reporting of Violent Extremism cases

There are several barriers and dynamics involved in the reporting of violent extremism incidents to the authorities. Most affected people tend to consider some aspects before reporting to the authorities about how they have been abused and all about their woeful experiences. Some people would avoid reporting because they feel inferior to the authorities, some because the culprits are family members, friends and people close to them. Some of these factors influence how people perceive violent extremism and why they should report. Out of the 236 respondents 56% did not report violent extremism incidents whereas the remaining 44% did report.

Respondents have different choices as to where they should report violent extremism incidents; some prefer reporting to police stations, churches, hospitals, chief’s place or NGOs around them. Those who reported to the police station were 74% of the sampled population while 18% to the chief’s office, 7% to the church and 1% to the hospitals. It is still interesting that despite fears of victimization, most community members report cases of violent extremism to the police.
The respondents had different views as to why they preferred reporting to respective authorities some citing reasons that the authorities were close (32%), some authorities maintained confidentiality and do not inform on culprits who reported (14%), some because those authorities always act (44%) while the remaining population had other views (11%).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Why did you choose to report where you did?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Action is always taken</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information confidentiality</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the reported incidents, only 45% of them were responded to, no action was taken on 46% of the cases and 9% could not tell whether any action was ever carried on incidents that they reported.

Interview with Reporting agencies (NPS, chiefs, religious leaders, hospitals, NGOs) revealed that most cases are referred to them by relatives or CSOs. In addition, all institutions reported a reduction of VE cases the beginning of 2018. The reduction has been attributed to several factors:

a) Fear of victimization by security agencies
b) Transfer of state officers which affects trust that was already build between the office and the other institutions/community
c) Actual reduction of VE cases
d) Aminiyat Concept
The Aminiyat Concept

Aminiyat is the intelligence gathering arm of Al Shabaab originating from Somalia. They use mainly independent contractor who have a more “permanent” or well known job which they trade in first and information second. This study has shown that they camouflage as police officers, religious leaders, businessmen/women etc. This has been confirmed by other studies which show that sex-workers and street kids have been used in major towns as Aminiyats since they see everything and no one notices them⁹.

This could explain reports given by some clerics that some of them are Al-Shabaab, In the words of one KII,
“Kuna MaKadhi wengine wanakuja tu mikutano kuslikiliza unachosema, kisha kesho unshtukia umekujiwa.....”¹⁰

Another one also said,
“In some police stations if you make a mistake of reporting cases of violent extremism, you won’t live to tell the story. So most of us just reported our cases to Marwa – The Former County Commissioner”

This concept is still not well understood by the population/communities that are expected to report these cases yet they have developed some stereotypes against the police thus hindering response. There is therefore the need to make efforts to create awareness on this concept.

¹⁰There are those Kadhis who only attend seminars and meetings to get information from other Kadhis, then the following day you get surprised when Al-Shabaab come for you.
3.2.3 Psychological Support for VE victims

It is important to note that 72% of the respondents did not know about existing counseling centers as opposed to 28% of the respondents. This shows that majority of the victims of VE may end up suffering with traumatic experiences without seeking for help.

This is reflected in by data showing that only 26% of the respondents knew of a person who had received psychological support and counseling while 74% of the other respondents never knew of a person that received psychological support.

Below is a table showing a summary of the names of facilities and individuals which are perceived by respondents to be giving counseling services.

Further probing and analysis revealed that most respondents perceived counseling as general advice including referrals. This is why most NGOs and facilities which do not offer psychosocial support appear on the list below.
The knowledge or perception of ownership also plays an important role not only determining access to services but also in establishing how to build synergy among key actors in the psychosocial sector. When probed on ownership, 10% knew those owned by Government, 15% knew those owned by NGOs, 3% knew those owned by community, while some classified the ownership as others -12%, and a huge percentage of 60% did not know the ownership of the facilities.

Further interview with KII and FGDs revealed that most of the institutions offering counseling for victims do not have specific strength in trauma counseling but rather general first-aid related counseling. In addition, existing Government own institutions or centres were formed to provide care to specific groups such as gender violence victims, drug addicts or mental health cases rather than trauma counselling. This hinders effective psychosocial support to VE victims.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of the counseling centers/Areas</th>
<th>Names of the counseling centers/ Areas</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Amani Counseling Centre</td>
<td>16. KIMYA</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Strechers Youth organization</td>
<td>17. Maima Likoni</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Village elders</td>
<td>18. Falcon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Port Reitze Health Center</td>
<td>19. Huduma Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. MUHURI</td>
<td>20. Coast Women In Development</td>
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<td>6. Youth Center Town</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Makadara / Coast General</td>
<td>22. Konowea Dispensary</td>
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<td>9. MUHIMU and Kituo Cha Sheria</td>
<td>23. Aisha (Community Women Leader) Mtaa</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. St John Ambulance</td>
<td>25. Faida Fatma</td>
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<td>12. CICC</td>
<td>26. LIKODEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Embakasi</td>
<td>27. Hatua Likoni Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Coast Education Centre</td>
<td>28. Churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. FIDA and Sauti ya kina Mama</td>
<td>29. Akhti Center for Women and Girls</td>
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The knowledge or perception of ownership also plays an important role not only determining access to services but also in establishing how to build synergy among key actors in the psychosocial sector. When probed on ownership, 10% knew those owned by Government, 15% knew those owned by NGOs, 3% knew those owned by community, while some classified the ownership as others -12%, and a huge percentage of 60% did not know the ownership of the facilities.
Some of the state-owned initiatives and partnerships on psychosocial support are shown below:

a) Kumekucha Program (Phase 1&2) by Mombasa County with support from Green Stream Network. The program is implemented in Likoni, Mvita and Kisauni. It offers community spaces for victims of VE. The county plans to integrate the program under different departments especially under Education Dept (Safe-Cities program). The first two phases are complete.

b) Shimo La Tewa (Women) partners with Amani for the provision of counselling to offenders. Shimo La Tewa Health Centre also provides additional counselling support. This is in addition to the spiritual counsellor who is a staff of Shimo prison.

c) State-Owned Medically (Methadone)-Assisted Therapy program for drug addicts at situated in free-Town health Facility11.

d) Gender Recovery Centre at Coast General Hospital

e) Gender Recovery Centre at Maunguja Dispensary in Kisauni for counselling for GBV victims

f) Mental Health centre in Port Reitz

Coast General Hospital which is the biggest Government Health institution in Mombasa receives 14 cases for men and 8 for women on a weekly basis in general but don’t have data for children who require counseling services. Despite this, the Hospital has no dedicated staff and room for psychosocial support. This shows how dire the situation is. The caregivers in the Hospital have no training on trauma counseling. The Hospital continues to rely on voluntary services of officers from Amani Counseling Centre to support.

Models of psychosocial support structures

There are two models that have been proposed for sustainable psychosocial support. Most stakeholders, however, reported that despite the fruits and milestones by the program, it has a negative effect on the school-going youth and other youth.

They therefore recommended that the institution be removed from the area and shifted to another space.

11Most stakeholders, however, reported that despite the fruits and milestones by the program, it has a negative effect on the school-going youth and other youth. They therefore recommended that the institution be removed from the area and shifted to another space.
Model 1 – The facilities will continuously provide psychosocial services and referrals based on the needs of survivors. In addition, the design is made to reduce the patient waiting-period before being served by the professional.

Do no Harm Principle - For each model that is chosen, security of victims/survivors must always be at the centre to ensure “Do no harm” principle is adhered to.

Model 2 – The design is premised on the assumption that the department of education will absorb the program within its long-term program.

3.2.3 Early Warning Systems for CVE
The survey has revealed that there is no single document/framework/guidelines on early warning signs and response mechanism not only in Mombasa County but also in the entire Country. This posse a great challenges on how duty bearers engage with community members on reporting and response to VE cases. On a slightly positive note, some key state officials have undergone training by CSOs and Inter-Governmental institutions.
However, interview with KIs revealed that a huge gap exist as most of the junior state officers who are directly in contact with the community have limited knowledge on the early warning signs. This is also the case in prisons as the prison guards and other junior officers have neither training nor awareness on the subject.

The Office of the Governor reported that there is a possibility of partnering with CSOs and PSOs to develop a framework on Early Warning Signs while Haki Africa revealed that its Draft Human Rights Guidelines has a section on community-led early warning signs. However, as much could not be reported on the document as the consultant could did not do a deeper analysis of the document due to time limitation. It would therefore be very important to evaluate the Haki Africa document as CWID plans to establish a partnership for a more sustainable framework.

It emerged from the survey that the community members would likely suspect that a family member/community member/neighbor/friend is engaging in violent extremism if they showed the following signs:

- If the suspect is fond of walking in gang groups
- Change of religion
- If the person expresses sudden change in behavior and/or isolation
- School drop outs are likely to be lured into violent extremism cases
- Alcohol and other substance abuse
- When one joins a gang group

### 3.2.4 Actors involved in CVE

Interviewees in FGDs and KIs stated that CVE actors include the government, security agencies, CSOs, policymakers, youth, women, and the collective representation of community members (including family heads, women leaders, youth leaders, elders, religious leaders, chiefs and community policing committees, MPs, MCAs etc).

#### 3.2.4.1 Programs by State Institutions

In Mombasa, the state agencies have various roles in CVE including implementation of MCAP-P/CVE. Specifically, the programs include:

**MCAP-P/CVE Coordination**

This is done through many institutions and partnerships. For instance,

a) Director of CVE, project officers, and Advisor to the Governor on CVE; all under the Officer of the Governor. These offices ensure implementation of CVE initiatives as well as coordination with stakeholders

b) MCAP – P/CVE Secretariat – The original host was Haki Africa since inception until the end of 2018 when this was handed over to CICC (Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics). Several challenges were cited as inhibiting the operations of the secretariat. Specifically, inadequate financial resources to facilitate meetings and other functions were named as the major challenge
c) County CVE Engagement Forum – This is co-chaired by the Office of the Governor and County Commissioner. Lack of commitments from members and inadequate financial resources to facilitate meetings was cited as the key challenge. On a more positive note, it also emerged that the Office of the Governor currently has a moderate budget to facilitate meetings as need arises.

Reintegration VEO
- **a)** Family conferences are organized at different stages by in prisons to enable reconciliations and reintegration process.
- **b)** National government has begun the returnees program. Currently, Shimo La Tewa prison has holding spaces for returnees where they are monitored before being enrolled into the program. However, the downside of this is the lack of policy guidelines on returnees. This has posed serious challenge as both county Govt and CSOs have reported difficulty to allocate resources on this program lest they are labelled sympathisers.

Prevention Initiatives
- **a)** Intelligence gathering-this is done by the NPS, NCTC, Interior Ministry through its chain of administration offices i.e. County Commissioner, Chief’s etc.
- **b)** Awareness programs are mainly run in an ad hoc manner at location or ward level through Chief’s Offices.
- **c)** Separation of VEOs from other prisoners- this is mainly done in prisons. Separate cells/domes have been created at Shimo La Tewa to reduce radicalization.
- **d)** Reporting systems - NPS, chiefs and County Commissioner are reported as most areas for reporting.
- **e)** Arrests mainly done by NPS and NCTC machinery

Key Challenges
1. County Govt of Mombasa feel left out in County Security Committee. This hinders information sharing between County Govt and National Govt.
2. Lack of a standard guiding document on early warning system. Most government officers rely on training offered by NGOs and Intergovernmental Organizations (UNODC among others)
3. Limited resources to adequately implement the MCAP. This will however be mitigated by completion of County Policy on CVE which advocates for Public Private Partnership for resource mobilization.
4. Lack and in some cases limited rooms and staff in health facilities to ensure psychological support program for victims.
5. Lack of Returnees Policy hindering effective support programs form returnees and reformed youth.
6. Inadequate human resources for psychosocial support
3.2.4.2 Programs by CSOs/PSO

Psychosocial Support

a) Amani Counselling Centre (ACC) has a well established program for trauma counselling. The counselling program covers loss, grieve, gender violence, drug addiction, marriage etc. The staff also partner with other Government institutions on a voluntary basis to provide counselling. For instance, ACC volunteers at Coast General Hospital to provide counselling for gender violence victims. In addition, it was mentioned that they also volunteer to support Shimo La Tewa prisons with counselling of offenders.

b) Some NGOs such Haki Africa have in house counsellors who offer emergency/initial care to victims before referring them to relevant institutions for adequate services.

c) Other CSOs such as CICC have a robust psychosocial program for VE victims especially the affected families. However, the program has had challenges such premature exit by victims of VE.

Awareness Creation & Community outreaches: Most NGOs have programs aimed at increasing awareness for community members. Various techniques are used. For instance, artivism, sports, public forums, online media campaigns, radio shows among others are continuously used by NGOs to ensure the availability of information to the public.

Public Interest Litigation and access to Justice: Some NGOs engage in direct litigation on behalf of victims and human rights defenders. This approach is mainly used when dialogue has failed and human rights abuses continue to take place or when duty bearers become non-responsive. In some cases, PIL is used to prevent potential human rights violation which is likely to happen in cases where policies or legislations are considered repugnant to justice. A good example is the current case against the Government on POTA in the wake of shrinking space for CVE initiatives.

In addition, most NGOs also work closely with the Office of the former County Commissioner and DCI. Most NGOs mentioned strongly that the office of the County Commissioner was very receptive on cases of VE and therefore it was secure and easy to work with the Office.

Economic Empowerment: Mostly private partners have established programs that enable victims and vulnerable members of the community to engage in business opportunities. For instance, KWAT has a mentorship program for young people and women to engage in income generating activities.

Some NGOs have also engaged private sector players such as Safaricom, Banks and Coca-Cola to support youth economic empowerment programs. Other NGOs have direct programs that support reformed youth VE victims to engage in meaningful and gainful activities.
Key Challenges

1. Competition among CSOs working on CVE programs. This inhibits the success of CVE programs within the County. To mitigate this, some CSOs have established networks where CSOs can share and learn. This reduces conflict and competition.

2. Conflict with Government - occasionally, there are circumstances where Human rights NGOs conflict with state agencies on cases of human rights abuses through protests or PIL. In some cases, PIL are filed against state agencies where policies or legislations tend to

3. Unsustainable relationships with state Officers. This is brought about by the constant transfer of officers. This threatens reporting as the community must first learn how to interact with the new officers as well as how firm they believe in confidentiality

3.2.4.3 Relationship between and among key actors
The study shows a relatively cordial relationship between and among key actors. However, there continue to exist several challenges that hamper maximum benefits in CVE.

Relationship between and among state agencies: Most state agencies interviewed indicated that the relationship with other state agencies is cordial. However, the following challenges were highlighted as inhibiting coordination and effective implementation of CVE initiatives:

a) The County Government is excluded from county security committee.

b) Occasional conflict between County and National Govt

Relationship between state agencies and CSOs/PSOs: Most state officers interviewed indicated that they have cordial and very complementary relationship with CSOs. Most NGOs and Intergovernmental institutions such as UNODC have supported both county and national government in several CVE initiatives. State officers have also partnered with CSOs on trainings related to CVE programs. Despite the cordial relationship, several of challenges were mentioned;

a) Seasonal programming by some CSOs. This makes it difficult for County Govt to assess or monitor the activities

b) Conflict with CSOs during protests and litigations against state decisions

c) Most CSOs' programs are not aligned to County Annual Development Plan.

Relationship between and among CSOs: Most CSOs that were interviewed indicated that they enjoy good working relationship among themselves. In fact, several of them reported that they continue to partner in resource mobilization, project planning, implementation and evaluation of phases. In addition, the study also revealed that many CSOs working on CVE programmes have networks where they share lessons.

However, competition for dwindling resources remains a major challenge that hinders effective partnerships. In addition, the regionalism war (Wabara versus Wenyeji led NGOs) continue to increase tension between NGOs thus hampering maximum outputs in CVE agenda.
Relationship between CSOs and PSOs: Most CSOs have partnered with PSOs generally on economic empowerment for reformed youth and vulnerable women and girls. This is either welcomed through corporate social responsibility model or economic empowerment model.

The study shows that some PSOs have direct mandate to train women on income generating initiatives as well as connect them with major international market. Some PSOs (such as Safaricom, Kenya Commercial Bank etc), however, only engage in such exercises through their CSR models.
4.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Conclusion
The findings presents opportunities for synergy building among stakeholders as well as models that may be adopted for sustainable CVE programming. While challenges are glaring, the report shows that joint efforts have previously yielded results thus the same would be critical if Mombasa County is to achieve excellence in CVE.

4.2 Recommendations

Part 1: Recommendations to the County Government
- Activation of Sub-County CVE Engagement Forums: This was recommended to facilitate adequate and effective participation of community members, including women-led CBOs and groups. This will also provide an opportunity for learning and sharing experiences. Duty bearers and partners will also be held accountable based on their roles and programs on CVE.
- Development (Jointly with National Government and CSOs) of Community Early Warning and Response System: This will enable not only community members but also duty bearers to clearly identify VE tendencies in good time and enable prompt response. This framework will also enable citizens to identify rapid-reporting spots in case they identify any early signs of VE.
- Establishment of a sustainable Psychosocial Support for victims of VE. The stakeholders at the validation/launch workshop recommended the use of Model 1.
- Partner with CSOs and other partners for resource mobilization for implementation of MCAP-P/CVE and other CVE programs.
- Department of Education should create more vocational training institutions for the youth

Part 2: Recommendations to the National Government
- The NPS should create more awareness on the anonymous reporting and Information systems. This will reduce fear of victimization
- The Ministry of Interior should make efforts for the inclusion of Mombasa County Government into the County Security Committee
- NCTC should avail resource for training of all key security agencies on early warning and response mechanism on CVE
- NGAF, WEF and YEF should work with County Government to ensure economic programs are set up for vulnerable victims of VE
- NCTC and the Ministry of Interior should develop Returnees policy
• Train primary and secondary school teachers on CVE counseling to support school-going youth.

Part 3: Recommendations to CSOs

• Support County Government in the Activation of Sub-County CVE Engagement Forums
• Support in the development of Community Early Warning and Response System
• Support in the establishment of Psychosocial Support for victims of VE
• Support with referral of cases of VE to the relevant state agencies for action.
• Mobilize more women-led groups to take active role in the implementation of MCAP-P/CVE

Part 4: Recommendations to PSOs

• Support in economic empowerment of reformed youth and vulnerable women and girls
• Take active role in sustainable dialogue and engagement with other stakeholders to ensure that the economics of VE are taken into consideration in CVE programming by all actors.
WITH SUPPORT FROM

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